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Abstract. Relevant logics provide an alternative to classical implication
that is capable of accounting for the relationship between the antecedent
and the consequence of a valid implication. Relevant implication is usu-
ally explained in terms of information required to assess a proposition.
By doing so, relevant implication introduces a number of cognitively rel-
evant aspects in the definition of logical operators. In this paper, we
aim to take a closer look at the cognitive feature of relevant implication.
For this purpose, we develop a cognitively-oriented interpretation of the
semantics of relevant logics. In particular, we provide an interpretation
of Routley-Meyer semantics in terms of conceptual spaces and we show
that it meets the constraints of the algebraic semantics of relevant logic.
1 Introduction
Paradoxes of classical material implication often show a mismatch between our
intuitions concerning valid patterns of reasoning and the formalization of impli-
cation provided by classical logic. Debates on the nature of implication can be
traced back to the very origin of modern logic, involving for instance Brentano,
Husserl, and Frege. Turning to contemporary developments of mathematical
logic, the problem of the logical properties of implication has been approached
by providing systems that aims to mend classical logic from inference patterns
that are not motivated on the basis of a specific view of reasoning.
Since in any logical system, the implication has the important role of encoding
the properties of logical inference, by rejecting the properties of classical implica-
tion, one is often lead to rejecting classical logic. For instance, intuitionistic logic
criticizes the non-constructive nature of classical implication. For that reason,
intuitionists designed an alternative logic that rejects inference by contradiction
and the law of the excluded middle. Moreover, relevant logic criticizes the lack of
connection between the premises and the conclusion of a logical inference made
explicit by some valid formula of classical logic, e.g., A → (B → A)—once A
holds, one can infer that any B entails A—or (A→ B)∨(B → A)—every pair of
propositions can be connected by means of an implication. By keeping track of
the antecedent-consequent connection, relevant logic prevents these paradoxes.
Furthermore, classical implication does not model any sort of relationship
between the knowing subject and the matter of the proposition. The truth-
conditional definition of the classical implication A→ B is given in terms of those
states of affairs such that either the state of affairs corresponding to A does not
hold or the state of affairs corresponding to B holds. Prosaically, A→ B is true
whenever A is false or B is true. The relationship between the antecedent and the
consequent of a classical implication can be understood only in terms of mere
co-occurrence between the states of affairs of the corresponding propositions.
The knowing subject is construed as a spectator of an independent reality that
displays itself. A number of approaches to non-classical logics can be categorized
as proposals to make logical implication sensitive to cognitively relevant aspects.
For instance, intuitionistic logic models the abstract concept of a knowing subject
and intuitionistic semantics is better understood in terms of proof-conditions
instead of truth-conditions, where a proof is intended to model the activity of a
knowing subject [20] with respect to propositions. A significant number of non-
classical logics are motivated by the idea of taking into account the activity of
the knowing subject, e.g., just to mention a few, justification logics [8], proof-
theoretical semantics [21], and number of relevant and substructural logics [13,
5]. Each of this approaches stresses that the information required to asses the
status of a proposition is an essential part of the meaning of the proposition.
We place our analysis within the tradition of relevant logics [13, 2], a family of
logics that have been traditionally interpreted as logics of information [12, 1, 13].
In particular, the analysis of relevant implication aims to investigate the connec-
tion between the information contained in the antecedent and the information
contained in the consequence. Although relevant logics are effective in preventing
paradoxes of material implication, a drawback is that their algebraic semantics
has been criticized on the ground that it lacks any strong intuitive motivation
[5]. To cope with that, a number of approaches to relevant logics provided an
intuitive reading of the semantics. From the point of view of cognition, the most
interesting approach is due to Mares [13] who interprets deduction in relevant
logics in terms of situated inference. Intuitively, a situation contains information
that is relevant to make a proposition hold, thus situations are truth-makers of
propositions. In this paper, we provide a version of the semantics of relevant
logic based on a notion of situation defined in terms of the theory of conceptual
spaces [9], a theory on how we conceptualize the reality and how we reason on
this conceptualization. Our aim is to motivate the idea of situated inference pro-
vided by Mares by means of the rich theory of cognition formalized by means
of conceptual spaces. The exhibition of a concrete instance of the semantics of
relevant logics based on a well developed model of cognition has a double im-
pact: (i) it provides a clean cognitive interpretation of relevant logics; and (ii)
it shows that relevant logics capture cognitively important aspects of inferences.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 introduce the background
on relevant logic and conceptual spaces. Section 4 informally describes the inter-
pretation of the semantics of relevant logic in terms of conceptual spaces, while
Section 5 provides the formal construction. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Relevant logic
We introduce a minimal background on the relevant logic R [2, 13, 7]. We confine
ourself to the implicative fragment of R that, by slightly abusing the notation,
1. A→ A
2. (A→ B) → ((B → C) → (A→ C))
3. A→ ((A→ B) → B)
4. (A→ (A→ B)) → (A→ B)
Table 1. Axioms for R
we still label by R. Let Atom be a set of propositional atoms and p ∈ Atom, the
language of R is inductively defined by:
LR := p | A→ A
The axioms for R are presented in Table 1 while its Hilbert system is introduced
as usual through the notion of derivation `R. The base case states that `Rφ,
where φ is an axiom in Table 1. The rule of modus ponens is then added: if
`RA, `RA→ B, then `RB. By reasoning in R, a number of paradoxes of clas-
sical implication are blocked. For instance, the monotonicity of the entailment
A→ (B → A), which is an axiom in classical logic. Its meaning is: if A holds,
then every B entails A, regardless the relevance of B for assessing A. Accord-
ingly, in relevant logics that axiom is not valid. Moreover, in case we also assume
a disjunction in our language, (A→ B) ∨ (B → A) is not a theorem of R.
2.1 Routley-Meyer Semantics
We present the model of substructural logic in terms of ternary relations, that is
due to Routley and Meyer [15, 18]. Ternary relations can be viewed as a gener-
alization of (relational) Kripke semantics for intuitionistic and modal logics. Let
S be a set of points and R ⊆ S3. Moreover, let 1 ∈ S be a designated element.
We define the following notations:
– R2(xy)zw iff there is an u ∈ S such that Rxyu and Ruzw;
– x ≤ y iff R1xy.
Definition 1 (Substructural frame)). A substructural frame S = (S, 1, R)
is a set S, with 1 ∈ S, equipped with a ternary relation R such that:
A1. x ≤ x (R1xx)
A2. Rxxx
A3. if R2(xy)zw, then R2(xz)yw
(if there is u s.t. Rxyu and Ruzw, then there is v s.t. Rxzv and Rvzw)
A4. if Rxyz, then Ryxz
A5. if Rxyz and x ≤ w, then Rwyz
A valuation in a substructural frame is defined by v : Atom→ P(S). The val-
uation is required to satisfy the following heredity condition: for every p ∈ Atom,
if x ∈ v(p) and x ≤ y, then y ∈ v(p). The valuation extends to any formula of
R, by the semantics of implication:
– s |= A→ B iff for all r,t such that Rsrt, if r |= A, then t |= B.
Heredity has to extend to complex formulas, and it is easy to check that it is
the case. The concept of truth in a model is defined by evaluating propositions
at the particular designed state 1.
Definition 2 (Substructural model). A substructural model (S, v) is a sub-
structural frame S equipped with a valuation v that satisfies heredity on atoms.
A formula A is true in a substructural model (S, v) iff 1 |= A. Moreover, A is
valid iff it is true in every substructural model (S, v).
This semantics is sufficient to show that the logic R is sound and complete
with respect to substructural models. The motivation for introducing a ternary
relation R is that it is needed for the semantics of implication: R relates the
states that are making A→ B, A, and B hold. Although the semantics based on
ternary relations has been criticized for its abstract nature, there is a number of
possible intuitive reading of R, cf. [5]. One of the reading of R groups the first
two components of the relation, R[xy]z, and can be read as “the combination
of information in x and y is in z”. This interpretation has been analyzed in
more details by Mares [13] in terms of situated inference. In very abstract terms,
the valuation associates situations to formulas and s |= A holds whenever the
information contained in situation s is relevant for A. The clause for implication
states that A → B holds at s if the information contained in s combined with
the information contained in r produces information t that is relevant for B. We
shall focus on this reading in order to provide a concrete cognitively-oriented
interpretation of ternary relations semantics.
3 Conceptual spaces
Ga¨rdenfors [9] proposes a cognitive model of representations based on the notion
of conceptual space. The theory of conceptual spaces is grounded on the notion
of similarity: “[j]udgments of similarity (...) are central for a large number of
cognitive processes (...) such judgments reveal the dimensions of our perceptions
and their structures” ([9], p.5). Quality dimensions—e.g., temperature, weight,
pitch, brightness—correspond to “the different ways stimuli are judged to be
similar or different” ([9], p.6). They are modeled as (possibly discrete) sets of
points that represent exact similarities between individuals. Those points repre-
sent the qualities of individuals: two individuals are located in the same point
when they are (cognitively or empirically) indistinguishable with respect to the
considered dimension, e.g., they have the same temperature, the same quality.
Furthermore, dimensions have a geometrical structure that organizes their points
according to the level of similarity between stimuli.
A set S of dimensions is integral if an individual located in one dimension
is necessarily located also in all the other dimensions in S. For example, {hue,
brightness} is integral because if an individual has a hue it necessarily has a
brightness (and viceversa). A set of dimensions is separable if it is not integral,
e.g., {hue, pitch}. In Ga¨rdenfors’s terminology, domains are maximal sets of
integral dimensions. For example, the hue, chromaticness, and brightness dimen-
sions that form the color domain {hue, chromaticness, brightness} are integral
and separable from any other dimension. Domains are central in the work of
Ga¨rdenfors because, by means of the separability condition, they can be used to
assign properties to individuals independently of other properties. For instance,
in empirical terms, the weight and the color of an individual can be measured
independently. The classificatory nature of the sensory systems is defended also
by Matthen [14]. In these views, properties do not have a strong ontological con-
notation, they do not capture how the world is but how it appears to us through
our sensory systems (or artificial sensors).1 The properties and the conceptual
spaces are understood relativistically: their structure depends on the underlying
culture, on measurement methods and sensors (in science), or on interpreta-
tion of the behavior of subjects (in the case of phenomenology). However the
determinate-determinable relation, see [19], makes sense also in this case. Fully
determinate properties, i.e., maximally resolving properties according to the sen-
sors one dispose of, are represented by points in the domain. Vice versa, deter-
minable properties, properties that abstract from the resolution of the sensor,
are represented by regions, i.e., sets of points in the domain. For instance, ‘being
scarlet’ and ‘being crimson’ can be seen as points, while ‘being red’ as a region
containing the previous two points. Natural properties are convex regions.
Conceptual spaces are defined as collections of one or more domains and con-
cepts are represented as regions in conceptual spaces. They are static theoretical
entities “in the sense that they only describe the structure of representations”
([9], p.31). Natural concepts are sets of regions in different domains “together
with an assignment of salience weights to the domains and information about
how the regions in different domains are correlated” ([9], p.105).
Finally, an individual is represented as a point in a conceptual space, a vector
of coordinates in the dimensions of the space. The points of the space can then
be seen as the representations of possibilia, the set of all the possible individuals.
4 From conceptual spaces to substructural models
Our goal is to provide a cognitive interpretation of the relevant logic R. More
specifically, following the idea of Mares, we provide an interpretation of the
substructural models of R (cf. Definition 2) in terms of the theory of conceptual
spaces properly modified and simplified for our goal. In this section we informally
present our idea while Section 5 contains the technical details.
We assume a finite and fixed number N of (disjoint) domains. The ith do-
main is noted Di. The dimensions of the domains are not relevant for our task,
then, to simplify our framework, we do not consider them. Consequently, we lose
the original distinction between qualities and properties and all our domains are
assumed as separable from the others. In addition, (fully) determinates, origi-
nally represented by points of a domain, are here singletons. In this way, both
1 Causation links between how the world is and how it appears to us can be considered.
the determinates and the determinables (the regions) are elements of a domain
Di. This move simplifies the formalization and is consistent with a mereological
view of domains where determinates correspond to atomic regions (see [6]). Fur-
thermore, ⊆ is the only relation between regions we consider, no topological or
geometrical relations are introduced.2 Finally, we represent the classification of
objects3 under the properties in the domains but not their categorization under
the concepts. Actually, concepts are not needed for our goal. This may appear
as an oversimplification of the original theory of conceptual spaces. However,
note that (i) our notion of domain is perfectly aligned with the original that can
be seen as a limit case of the one of concept, i.e., regions in the domains are
simple concepts; (ii) links between domains useful to define natural concepts are
modeled via correlations (see below); (iii) the basic framework introduced here
can be easily modified to take into account dimensions while categorization is
an extension that could underline a new kind of implication (in addition to the
ones we discuss in Section 6) to be addressed in future work.
The original idea of representing individuals as vectors of points (singletons
in our case) each one belonging to a different domain is too strong for our
aims. This view assumes a complete knowledge about the individuals, while
we are interested in the acquisition of knowledge, information, or data, about
individuals. We then weaken the original theory by allowing two kinds of partial
knowledge about individuals: (i) the exact location into a domain is not known,
i.e., one can only assign a determinable property to the individual, e.g., one
knows it is red, but not the exact shade of red; (ii) one does not have any
information about a given property, one does not even know if an individual is
located in a given domain, e.g., if it has a color or not. Firstly, note that in (i) one
may consider the maximal region of a domain. That means, for instance, that
one only knows that the individual is colored. Secondly, (ii) contemplates the
case of individuals that lack some properties, i.e., individuals are not necessarily
located in all the domains. For instance, abstract individuals are not in space,
while holes do not weight. However, we do not represent the impossibility to be
located in a domain4 but only the lack of information (see below).
The assumption that the conditions of individuation of objects are purely
conceptual has been criticized by Pylyshyn. In [16] he explores the idea that
“[p]art of what it means to individuate something is to be able to keep track
of its identity despite changes in its properties and location” ([16], p.33). The
initial individuation and tracking of objects is not conceptual, i.e., it is not based
on the classification under concepts, it is based on a lower level mechanism built
into the visual system called FINST. We cannot enter here into the details of the
approach. What is interesting for us is the link, provided by Pylyshyn, with the
theory of object files [11]. One “can think of an object file as a way for informa-
2 Consequently, the structural relations of spaces, e.g., distances or orders, are here
only used to build the taxonomy of properties. As discussed in Section 6, this struc-
tural information could be also used to represent relations among objects.
3 From here we use ‘object’ and ‘individual’ as synonymous.
4 That could be useful for approaching the semantics of negation.
tion to be associated with objects that are selected and indexed by the FINST
mechanism. When an object first appears in view (...) a file is established for
that object. Each object file has a FINST reference to the particular individ-
ual to which the information refers.” ([16], p.38) The file allows us to group and
maintain all the informations associated to the same individual (maybe acquired
or updated through time), in particular “the one-place predicates that pertain to
that object” ([16], p.39). An object file may be seen as an updatable frame-based
description of an individual.5
Following this idea, we assume a fixed set OB of objects that are described by
objects files defined as tuples 〈a,R1, . . . , Rn〉 where a∈OB and Ri⊆Di is a set
of regions of Di. Firstly, object files are contextual, they depend on the chosen
sets of domains and objects. Secondly, they collect all the known properties of
a given object, i.e., all their known locations inside the domains. Intuitively, an
object file represents the whole information about an object one has at a given
stage, i.e., in an ontological perspective, the collection of states of affairs [3] rel-
ative to the same object. Thirdly, the Ri are sets of regions rather than simply
regions. This extension of the original notion of location into domains is required
to represent the process of making the acquired knowledge about an object ex-
plicit. As an illustrative example, assume that the color domain contains three
subregions such that: scarlet⊂ red⊂ colored. In f=〈a, {scarlet}〉 the only
explicit knowledge is the scarletness of a, whereas f ′=〈a, {scarlet, red}〉 adds
the redness of a. By looking at the structure of the color domain, the knowledge
in f ′ was already present in f , but only in an implicit form, i.e., f ′ is the result
of an inference process, a cognitive abstraction activity. In mathematics, one can
see this situation as the introduction of a new theorem. The theorem was implicit
in the theory but, by making it explicit, we add, in some sense, information.6
Fouthly, we need to guarantee that object files contain consistent information,
e.g., it is possible to have 〈a, {scarlet, red}〉 but not 〈a, {red, blue}〉 (if ‘being
red’ and ‘being blue’ are disjoint). Finally, Ri=∅ represents the total lack of in-
formation, discussed above, about the ith domain. In particular, f=〈a, ∅, . . . , ∅〉
represents just the existence of a∈OB .
A situation can be seen as a set of object files for the objects OB with respect
to the domains D1, . . . ,DN, i.e., as a the collection of states of affairs relative to
the objects OB expressible with the same set of properties. Because the Ri in
the object files may be the empty set or may represent determinable properties,
in general the situations capture partial information about the objects. In par-
ticular, the situation 1 is the situation where all the object files have the form
〈a, ∅, . . . , ∅〉, i.e., the situation 1 represents only the terminological knowledge.
5 Note that we do not consider time, updating must be intended in terms of knowledge
or information acquisition steps.
6 In an empirical scenario where one disposes of instruments with different resolutions,
the previous situation could be seen as the acquisition of a new measure with a
coarser resolution. We do not consider this interesting observational perspective
where one could also acquire new measures with identical resolution, e.g., one would
be able to distinguish 〈a, {scarlet, scarlet}〉 from 〈a, {scarlet}〉.
Then, we model the reachability relation between situations in terms of up-
dates of the information contained in a situation. Intuitively, given the situation
s, t, and u, Rstu holds when the object files in u can be obtained by means
of the ones in s and t through two possible types of updating: abstraction and
correlation. Abstraction generalizes conceptualization within the same domain
(e.g. from scarlet to red), i.e., it relies on the ⊆-structure of domains. Vice versa
correlation individuates dependencies between distinct domains, for instance, it
may relate colors and shapes. Induction, as understood by Ga¨rdenfors, is an ex-
ample of correlation: “[t]he essential role of induction is to establish connections
among concepts or properties from different domains” ([9], p.211). More specif-
ically, the “inductive process corresponds to determining mappings between the
different domains of a space. Using such a mapping, one can then determine cor-
relations between the regions of different domains. The correlation between two
properties F and G, expressed on the symbolic level by a universal statement
of the form “all F s are Gs,” would then just be a special case” ([9], p.228). We
represent only the simple correlation between two properties by a pair of regions,
the regions that represent these properties.
Finally, following the Routley-Meyer Semantics, the function of valuation v
assigns to any atomic proposition a set of situations.
5 Conceptual spaces and relevant logic
We formally define the notions introduced in the previous section. A domain D is
given by the set of all regions over a set of values D={p1, . . . , pl}: D=P?(D)=
P(D)\∅, where we exclude ∅ to avoid counterintuitive “null properties”. In what
follows, we fix a set of N domains D1, . . . ,DN, denoted by D¯. We denote by r
1
i ,
..., rni the elements of a domain Di. Elements r
j
i are called regions of the domain.
We sometimes use names for labeling regions. For instance, let D = {p1, p2, p3},
then D has as elements regions such as {p1}, {p2}, and {p1, p2}. We may then
label scarlet={p1}, crimson={p2} and red={p1, p2}.
Given a domain Di, we denote by Ri ⊆ Di a set of regions in Di.




Intuitively, as we will see, consistent sets of regions can be intended as non-
exclusive properties that can in principle be ascribed to an object. In case the
set of regions is empty, it represents the absence of information of type Di
concerning that object. For instance, Ri = {scarlet = {p1}, red = {p1, p2}}
is consistent, since the intersection of the regions in Ri is not empty, whereas
R′i={scarlet={p1}, crimson={p2}} is not. That is, we can say that an object
is both scarlet and red, as for instance scarlet⊆ red, but we cannot say that
it is both scarlet and crimson.
Moreover, we fix a set OB ={a1, . . . , al} of objects.
Definition 4 (Object files). An object file fa is a vector 〈a,R1, . . . , Rn〉, where
a∈OB, Ri⊆Di, such that each Ri is consistent.
The set of all object files depends on the choice of D¯ and OB , so we denoted
by OBFOBD¯ .We can now introduce the definition of situation.
Definition 5 (Situation). A situation s is a set of object files s ⊆ OBFOBD¯
such that, for every object a∈OB, there exist a unique object file fa∈s.
Then, we assume a number of correlations relating regions in different domains.
Definition 6 (Correlations). A set of correlations COR is a set of pairs of
regions (rli, r
m
j ), where r
l
i∈Di and rmj ∈Dj, i, j∈{1, . . . ,N} and i 6=j. Moreover
correlations satisfy the following conditions:
Restricted transitivity if (rli, r
m




Correlation composition if (rli, r
m
j )∈COR and rhi ⊆rli, then (rhi , rmj )∈COR;
if (rli, r
m
j )∈COR and rmj ⊆rhj , then (rli, rhj )∈COR.
Restricted transitivity states that if we can connect two regions in a number
of steps, we can also connect them by composing the correlations in one single
step. The condition h 6= j in the restricted transitivity excludes that we end
up relating regions of the same domain. For instance, it prevents passing from
(scarlet, round) and (round, crimson) to (scarlet, crimson). The rules for
correlation composition state that if we correlate a concept with another, the
correlation applies also to the subconcept of the first one and to super-concept
of the second one. For instance, if we say that red things are round, we also say
that scarlet things are round. We do not put any further consistency constraint
on correlations. The reason is that correlations are intended to represent factual,
but not necessarily correct, mappings between concepts. For instance, we do not
exclude from COR correlations that can end up in inconsistent outcomes, e.g.
(round, scarlet) and (round, crimson). The point is that correlations express
matters of fact, thus they are falsifiable and in principle revisable. By contrast,
conceptual information is fixed and non-revisable.
We turn now to the interpretation of the ternary relation R in our setting.
Intuitively, situations are related if they are reachable by means of an abstraction
move or by means of a correlation link. Denote by fsa the (unique) object file fa
in situation s. Moreover, denote by Rsa,i the set of regions of Di that in situation
s are associated to object a. We are ready now to present our interpretation of
the ternary relation in terms of reachability of situations.
Definition 7 (Reachability of situations). Let u, t and s situations in OBFOBD¯ .
The situation u is reachable from t given s, i.e., Rstu, iff:
R1. for all a∈OB, for all Rua,i then Rua,i ⊇ (Rsa,i ∪Rta,i);
i.e., all the data in s and t are imported in u;
R2. for all a∈OB, for all r∈Rua,i\(Rsa,i ∪Rta,i), r is obtained in one of the two
following ways:
Abstraction there exists r′∈Rsa,i ∪Rta,i such that r′⊆r;
Correlation there exists r′∈Rsa,j ∪Rta,h such that (r′, r)∈COR.
Rstu imposes that the whole information in u is derived (by using conceptual
knowledge or correlations) from the one in s and the one in t. R1 entails that
the regions in s and t are preserved in u. R2 shows that all the new regions in
u are derived from the ones in s and t by abstraction or by correlation. Note
that, in principle, a situation could be updated through abstraction and correla-
tion into something that is not a situation, i.e., into a set of inconsistent object
files. For instance, suppose that (round, crimson) ∈ COR and that scarlet
and crimson are disjoint. Suppose D¯ contains just two domains, e.g. colors and
shapes. Thus, a situation s that contains 〈a, {scarlet, red}, {round}〉 can be
updated, by means of the correlation (round, crimson), to a set of object files
that contains 〈a, {scarlet, red, crimson}, {round}〉, which violates consistency
of the sets of regions that is required for object files. Since we are assuming that
R is defined on situations, i.e. sets of object files with consistent Ri-sets, the case
above is excluded. This point shows a significant difference between abstraction
and correlation: abstraction guarantees consistency of the update, whereas cor-
relation does not. This reflects the distinction between conceptual and factual
knowledge. Once the conceptual relations are set and we have assumed that they
are consistent, by abstraction we can only generalize on given data. By contrast,
correlations introduce new data that may be inconsistent with previous ones.
We define the following relation of consistency between situations (Cst)
Definition 8 (Consistent situations Cst). The two situations s and t are
consistent, noted by Cst, iff:
C1. for i∈{1, . . . ,N}, Rsa,i ∪Rta,i is consistent (cf. Definition 3)
By means of Definition 7, we can infer that, if a situation u is reachable from
t given s, then u is consistent both with s and with t and s is consistent with t.
Proposition 1. If Rstu, then Csu, Ctu, and Cst.
Proof. Assume Rstu, that entails by R1 that for every i and every object a,
Rsa,i ∪ Rta,i ⊆Rua,i. Thus, since Rua,i is consistent by definition, then Rsa,i ∪ Rta,i
is consistent, so Cst. The other cases follows by noticing that Rsa,i ⊆ Rua,i and
Rta,i⊆Rua,i. 
We conclude this paragraph by providing an interpretation of the element
1 of the substructural model. We define 1 as the situation in which we have
no information about any object, i.e., 1 := {〈a, ∅, . . . , ∅〉 | a ∈ OB}. Every
〈a, ∅, . . . , ∅〉 is an object file, that is, it satisfies consistency. Moreover 1 is a
situation, since for every object, there exist a unique object file in 1.
5.1 Conceptual spaces as models of R
We can now show that our view of situations provides a model of relevant logic.
Definition 9 (Conceptual substructural model). A conceptual substruc-
tural model is given by (〈S,COR, R, 1〉, v), where 〈S,COR, R, 1〉 is a conceptual
substructural frame: S is a set of situations defined wrt. a domain D¯ and a set
of objects OB, COR is a set of correlation between regions of D¯, R ⊆ S3 is a
reachability relation, and 1 := {〈a, ∅, . . . , ∅〉 | a ∈ OB}. Moreover, v is a valua-
tion that associates to atoms sets of situations, i.e., v : Atom→ P(S) such that
heredity holds.
We only need to show that R and 1 satisfy the axioms of Definition 1.
Proposition 2. The reachability of situations R satisfies axioms A1, A2, A3,
A4, and A5 of Definition 1.
Proof. We only show the details of the representative cases.
A1: R1ss. R1 trivially holds. R2 holds because Rsa,i\(R1a,i ∪Rsa,i)=∅.
A2: If Rstu, then Rtsu. It is sufficient to notice that the definition of R is sym-
metric wrt. Rsa,i and R
t
a,i.
A3: If R2(st)uw, then R2(su)tw. We need to show that if there exists an x such
that Rstx and Rxuw, then there exists a y such that Rsuy and Rytw. Assume
that there exists an x such that Rstx and Rxuw.




Firstly, we show that Rsuy. We have that Rsa,i ∪ Rua,i⊆Rya,i =Rsa,i ∪ Rua,i, thus
R1 is fine. Since there is no other regions in Rya,i, we can conclude that R2 is
also satisfied. Hence, Rsuy.
Then, we have to show Rytw. By assumption, Rxa,i ∪ Rua,i ⊆ Rwa,i , thus we can
deduce Rya,i ∪Rta,i ⊆ Rwa,i. So R1 is satisfied.
Suppose now that there is an r∈Rwa,i\Rya,i∪Rta,i, that is r∈Rwa,i\Rsa,i∪Rua.i∪Rta,i.
Since by assumption Rxuw, every region r in w is obtained by abstraction or
correlation from regions in x or u. If r is obtained by abstraction or correlation
from a region in Rua,i, then we are done, since R
u
a,i ⊆ Rya,i. If r is obtained from
regions in x, then, by assumption Rstx, so r is obtained from regions that are
either in s or t. We approach the following cases:
(i) r is obtained by correlation from an r′∈Rxa,i and r′ is obtained from correla-
tion from an r′′∈Rsa,i. This means that (r′, r), (r′′, r′)∈COR, thus, by restricted
transitivity, (r′′, r)∈COR. Therefore, if r ∈ Rwa,i \Rsa,i ∪Rua.i ∪Rta,i, then there
is an r′′∈Rsa,i such that (r′′, r)∈COR, thus we conclude;
(ii) r is obtained by correlation from an r′ ∈ Rxa,i and r′ is obtained by ab-
straction from an r′′ ∈ Rsa,i. This means that r′′ ⊆ r′ and (r′, r) ∈ COR, thus,
by the first rule of correlation compoistion, (r′′, r) ∈ COR. Therefore, for r ∈
Rwa,i \ Rsa,i ∪ Rua.i ∪ Rta,i, there is an r′′ ∈ Rsa,i such that (r′′, r) ∈ COR and we
conclude again;
(iii) r is obtained by abstraction from r′ in x and r′ is obtained by abstraction
from r′′ in s. Then r can be obtained by abstraction from r′′ and we are done;
(iv) r is obtained by abstraction from r′ in x and r′ is obtained by correlation
(r′′, r′) ∈ COR from r′′ in s. In this case, r′ ⊂ r and (r′′, r′) ∈ COR, thus by the
second rule of correlation composition we infer (r′′, r) ∈ COR and we conclude.
Therefore, also R2 is satisfied, therefore Rytw.
A4: Rsss holds, since R1 trivially holds and Rsa,i\(Rsa,i ∪Rsa,i)=∅.
A5: If Rstu and w ≤ s, then Rwtu. Recall that w ≤ s is defined by R1ws.
We show only the following case. Suppose r ∈ Rua,i \Rwa,i ∪ Rta,i and that r is
obtained by means of correlation from r′. In case r′ ∈ Rwa,i ∪ Rta,i, we are done.
Otherwise, by assumption r′ ∈ Rsa,i and (r, r′)∈COR. Since R1ws, there are two
cases. Firstly, there exists r′′ such that (r′′, r′)∈COR. By restricted transitivity,
we conclude that for r ∈Rua,i\Rwa,i ∪ Rta,i, there exists an r′′ in Rwa,i such that
(r′′, r) ∈ COR. Secondly, r′ is obtained by abstraction from r′′ in Rwa,i, in this
case by correlation composition, we conclude. 
It is important to notice that the provided interpretation in terms of situa-
tions does not trivialize the substructural model, namely R does not provide a
model of intuitionistic or classical implication. To see that, we show that mono-
tonicity does not hold in conceptual substructural models. In axiomatic terms,
monotonicity corresponds to the validity of A→ (B → A). In semantic terms,
it corresponds to the following constraint on the ternary relation [7]:
f1 Rstu⇒ R1su
Consider a simple example where s={〈a, ∅〉, 〈b, {scarlet}〉}, t={〈a, {scarlet}〉,
〈b, ∅〉}, and u={〈a, {scarlet, red}〉, 〈b, {scarlet}〉}. In this case, althoughRstu,
neither R1su nor R1tu hold, i.e., both the information in s and t is needed for
u. Therefore, (f1) does not hold in every conceptual substrctural model, thus
A→ (B → A) is not valid.
6 Conclusions and future work
We presented a concrete instantiation of the ternary relation model of the rele-
vant logic R that is grounded on the framework of conceptual spaces.Our instan-
tiation of the Routley-Meyer semantics provides a number of reasons to interpret
relevant implication in terms of cognitively aware updates of knowledge. Besides
the logical contribution, we believe that both the notion of situation and the
one of reachability between situations provide a useful framework for separating
conceptual and factual knowledge and for modeling knowledge acquisition. How-
ever, the cognitive plausibility of the interpretation of the inferential mechanism
we proposed still lacks an empirical assessment.
Future work concerns two directions. Firstly, notice that the proposed frame-
work provides an interpretation only to atomic propositions that reduce to the
assignment of a (unary) property to an object, it does not consider relations
among objects. The extension to relations definable in terms of relations among
intrinsic properties of the relata is quite trivial.7 Using conceptual spaces, this
kind of relations can be represented by means of higher level properties (see [9,
7 Even though one has to decide whether relational information is encoded in the
objects files—e.g., if REL(a, b) holds then one needs to add this information in both
the object-file relative to a and b—or outside them.
sect.3.10.1]). For instance, suppose to have the dimension length structured by
the order relation ≤. The relation shorter than can be represented by a region
in the space of the pairs of length-values, i.e. the region of all pairs (l1, l2) such
that l1 ≤ l2. Thus, an object x is shorter than an object y if the pair (length
of x, length of y) belongs to this region. Ga¨rdenfors seems to suggest that this
approach is general enough to represent all the (binary) relations: “[a] relation
between two objects can be seen as a simple case of a pattern of the location
of the objects along a particular quality dimension” [9, p.93]. However, some
structural relations, e.g., part-whole relations, seem to require really complex
spaces founded on several quality dimensions (see [17]). More importantly, it is
not clear to us how some relations like eat or married to can be reduced to in-
trinsic properties of relata. Similarly for relational categories [10], i.e., properties
that are defined in relational terms, e.g., a carnivore is an animal that eats meat.
Secondly, in Definition 7, we have distinguished two possible ways of updating
the information contained in a situation: abstraction and correlation. We have
suggested that, intuitively, they correspond to two distinct types of processes: the
first abstracts from already given data, the second allows to indirectly discover
new data, a sort of indirect measurements. Contrast the following sentences:
i. “If a is scarlet, then a is red” and
ii. “If a is scarlet, then a is round.”
In our model, (i) updates a situation s that contains, let say, 〈a, {scarlet}, ∅〉
into a situation t that contains 〈a, {scarlet, red}, ∅〉 whereas (ii) is an update
from s to a situation t′ that contains 〈a, {scarlet}, {round}〉. Both these up-
dates add information that was implicit, but they qualitatively differ because
the update in (i) impacts the same domain while the one in (ii) impacts a dif-
ferent domain. Furthermore, our intuition is that (i) holds just in virtue of ‘the
scarletness of a’, while (ii) holds in virtue of both ‘the scarletness of a’ and
‘the roundness of a’ (assuming that ‘being scarlet’ and ‘being round’ are both
fully determinate properties). In terms of truth-makers (see [4]) this means that
the two propositions ‘a is scarlet’ and ‘a is red’ share the same truth-maker
(‘the scarletness of a’). By contrast, the two propositions ‘a is scarlet’ and ‘a is
round’ need two different truth-makers, i.e., only the second inference reveals the
existence of an implicit truth-maker. This would suggest that the first kind of
reasoning, the abstraction, is a purely mental process that does not need verifica-
tion. By contrast, the second kind of reasoning, the correlation, needs additional
validation in terms of truth-makers. Actually this provides a partial justification
of the asymmetry between the required consistency of the conceptual knowledge
vs. the possibility to have inconsistent correlations. An interesting question is
whether it is possible to distinguish the two process in terms of inferential pat-
terns, that is, we ask whether it is meaningful to define two kinds of implications,
one corresponding to the sole updating by abstraction, and one corresponding
to updating by correlation. We leave for future work the axiomatization of these
two types of implications that, in our framework, can be characterized by two
distinct reachability relations: one that only permits updates by abstraction, the
other that only permits updates by correlations.
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